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This paper offers interesting description and comments on several recent public 
apologies. I’m pleased to see the interest in this topic and, needless to say, the attention 
given to some of my work on these and related topics. 
 I support the authors’ claims that discourse should be taken seriously; that public 
deliberation and argument are not ‘just words,’ but are ways of sharing in the 
construction of a future; and that in the aftermath of serious wrongs, a fresh narrative will 
require dialogue and acknowledgement among the involved parties. One aspect on which 
I partially disagree has to do with the involvement of argument in all this. When we are 
considering public apology, we may think of three stages of discourse as potentially 
including argumentation. First, there is the stage before the apology, when people are 
reflecting on what they did and considering relevant details about what was done, 
attending to issues such as victims, harms, responsibility, and wrongfulness. What was 
done? Who did it? Was it wrong? Why? Who were the victims? How were they harmed? 
What do they need now? Second, there is the presenting of the apology; in the case of 
public apologies, the presenter is often a spokesperson for a collective or group and his or 
her legitimacy in that role may be a central issue. Third, after the apology, there will be 
discourse about how to follow up. Is restitution possible? Redress in the form of financial 
compensation? Redress in some other form? I find it easy to envisage a role for argument 
in the first and third stages, but more difficult to envisage it as having a role at the second 
stage. In my experience, an apology as such would be unlikely to contain an argument in 
the classic sense of reasons being presented with the goal of supporting a conclusion. 
Checking the texts of the Australian and Canadian apologies, I found no arguments in this 
sense. In the Canadian case, the word “therefore” appears, but appears to play more of an 
explanatory role, as following explanatory material and introducing a description of the 
phenomenon to be explained. 
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Complete public apologies incorporate acknowledgement that the acts committed 
were wrong, and that the apologizing person or group accepts responsibility for doing 
them, feels remorse or sorrow about role, and will undertake practical amends to the 
extent that doing so is feasible. About the content of such apologies, the context and 
nature of their issuance, and other details there should be and likely will be much 
deliberation before the apology is issued. At this stage there should be a substantial role 
for argumentation. It may even be useful for responsible parties to negotiate with victims 
as to the wording of these apologies and the appropriateness of practical amends. So that 
is the first stage. Then, after a public apology has been issued, we can see how there 
might be further debate about its content, degree of impact, and other details, noteworthy 
among these being what the appropriate follow-up would be in the area of practical 
amends. That is the third stage. But argument seems much less plausible as an aspect of 
the middle stage—the apology itself. The apology itself articulates acknowledgement 
along lines resolved by earlier discussion. It will communicate a resolved position to 
victims and others. If we understand such an apology to be addressed primarily to victims 
of the wrongdoing, they are unlikely to need reasons to support claims that wrongs have 
been done to them and moral regret is appropriate. The apology will also be addressed to 
the public at large, to which acknowledgement and an implied commitment not to 
commit such actions again will be highly relevant.  
Since this is, after all, a conference on argumentation, it seems appropriate to 
make one logic-focused comment about the position of the former Australian Prime 
Minister, John Howard. Howard made quite a point of not issuing an apology regarding 
the Australian government’s role in the forced removal of Aboriginal children from their 
families. His argument was that a state apology would imply that individual Australian 
citizens (white ones, presumably) should feel personal shame and guilt about the policy 
of removals. Howard argued that as individuals, Australians were not guilty of anything; 
many were too young to have been involved or had had no causal responsibility in 
bringing about these removals. His view was that a state apology would imply individual 
responsibility; that individual responsibility did not exist; therefore there should be no 
state apology. In its opening claim, this argument incorporates the fallacy of division.  
Contrary to what Howard assumed, to accept collective state responsibility is not to imply 
individual responsibility; the state is a collective institution with its own powers and 
capacities and the state level of analysis is distinct from the individual level of analysis. 
There were likely other reasons for Howard’s resistance to a state apology but this 
particular one is flawed, showing the impact of the fallacy of division on a highly serious 
and important public debate. 
I would now to add some empirical comments on the Canadian case. Belanger, 
Gilbert, and Goodnight interestingly discuss this important example, noting the 
resignation of Justice Harry LaForme, who had accepted an invitation to be its first 
chairperson. Citing the CBC as a source, they claim that Justice LaForme resigned due to 
a disagreement about whether the commission was to focus primarily on documenting 
historical evidence with narratives of suffering and abuse in the schools (the ‘truth’ 
aspect) or, rather, extend itself to fostering reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians, the ‘reconciliation’ aspect. Modeled on the South African TRC, 
this commission was to incorporate, as implied in its name, a relationship between truth 
and reconciliation. The nature of this relationship is far more complex than one might at 
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first suppose. In addition to its intrinsic importance, if there had been a fundamental 
dispute in this context about the relation between ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation,’ that dispute 
would be of considerable interest to theorists and practitioners of reconciliation. In the 
early days of the South African TRC, there was a widespread enlightenment assumption 
as in ‘the truth shall set you free.’ It was presumed that just knowing and acknowledging 
the truth about how victims had suffered under apartheid would have a highly positive 
role for reconciliation. The idea was that those who had supported apartheid would gain a 
fuller appreciation of the nature of its institutions and the profound suffering they had 
caused, and that understanding would provide empathy and shifts toward better 
relationships. This presumption is quite plausible and surely holds in some cases. 
 But this viewpoint that truth-telling will lead to reconciliation turned out to be 
unduly optimistic. A key problem is that individual narratives are open to question and 
there are often deep disputes about their correctness and representativeness. For victims 
to want to reconcile, it is not enough for their stories to be told and heard in an 
atmosphere of respect and sympathy. They need to feel that what they understand to be 
truths are accepted and acknowledged by perpetrators and those groups whom 
perpetrators thought they were defending in the struggle.   
Now as to problems of the Canadian TRC, so far as I have been able to discover, 
they have not centered mainly on this highly interesting matter. Important underlying 
issues lie elsewhere. They include disagreements between LaForme and other 
commissioners; disputes about the hierarchy of authority in decision-making among the 
commissioners (LaForme had understood that in cases of disagreement he was the chief 
commissioner and had over-riding authority whereas the other two commissioners, both 
women, envisaged consensus decision-making among the three); the role of government 
persons in TRC processes; the role of lawyers in those processes; and disagreements 
within Aboriginal groups in Canada about the role of the Assembly of First Nations under 
the leadership of Phil Fontaine. There may even have been disagreements about the 
desirability of a TRC.  
 I would like conclude by making some comments about the relation between 
certain of the key concepts involved in explorations of apology and reconciliation. An 
apology necessarily incorporates acknowledgement of responsible wrongdoing, sorrow 
attached to that acknowledgement, and implied commitments not to do such things again 
and to make practical amends if possible. If a statement merely announces ‘regret’ or 
avoids acceptance of responsibility by some device such as passive language (‘we are 
sorry these things happened to you…’) or including excuses or justifications (‘we had to 
do it, we had no choice…’), that statement cannot count as a moral apology. Any moral 
apology must incorporate acknowledgement of responsibility for committing those 
actions agreed to be wrong. But the converse does not hold; not all moral 
acknowledgement is contained within apology. Clearly, there are other forms. A museum 
about slavery and its brutal practices is a way of acknowledging that slavery is wrong. An 
adopted textbook describing the suffering of victimized populations amounts to public 
acknowledgement of serious historic wrongs.  
 As to the relation between apology and forgiveness, an apology may include an 
explicit request for forgiveness; even when such a request is not explicit, it is often 
contextually understood. But as noted in this paper, that is not always the case. This 
qualification is necessary when we speak of public apologies. It is a mistake to think of 
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these statements as requests for forgiveness, as something that would benefit perpetrators. 
Public moral apologies articulate and consolidate central values, acknowledge 
wrongdoing to victims, express sorrow, and indicate some intent to undertake practical 
amends. These are statements to victims and to the public at large. The point of apologies 
is to address victims and the general public and to state that these people were wronged 
and deserved better, thereby indicating respect and vindicating victims. As for 
reconciliation, apologies and forgiveness can power contribute powerfully to 
reconciliation, but they are not strictly necessary for it. What may be necessary is moral 
acknowledgement. One might argue that reconciliation could result from shared 
cooperative activity in the absence any deliberation and discussion about the nature of 
past wrongs. That claim merits investigation – although I am still inclined to insist on 
moral acknowledgement as necessary for reconciliation. One powerful way of expressing 
that moral acknowledgement is apology, as illustrated by the three cases discussed here.  
 
          Link to paper 
